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Abstract 
The objective of this subtask of the Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Design project was to 
demonstrate mitigation technologies for radiological material dispersal and to assist planners 
with incorporation of the technologies into a concept of operations. 
 
The High Consequence Assessment and Technology department at Sandia National Laboratories 
(SNL) has studied aqueous foam’s ability to mitigate the effects of an explosively disseminated 
radiological dispersal device (RDD).  These benefits include particle capture of respirable 
radiological particles, attenuation of blast overpressure, and reduction of plume buoyancy.  To 
better convey the aqueous foam attributes, SNL conducted a study using the Explosive Release 
Atmospheric Dispersion model, comparing the effects of a mitigated and unmitigated explosive 
RDD release.  Results from this study compared health effects and land contamination between 
the two scenarios in terms of distances of effect, population exposure, and remediation costs. 
 
Incorporating aqueous foam technology, SNL created a conceptual design for a stationary 
containment area to be located at a facility entrance with equipment that could minimize the 
effects from the detonation of a vehicle transported RDD.  The containment design was 
evaluated against several criteria, including mitigation ability (both respirable and large fragment 
particle capture as well as blast overpressure suppression), speed of implementation, cost, 
simplicity, and required space.  A mock-up of the conceptual idea was constructed at SNL’s 
9920 explosive test site to demonstrate the containment design. 
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Executive Summary 
The objective of this subtask of the Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Design Project, funded by 
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency during fiscal years 2004 and 2005, was to demonstrate 
mitigation technologies for radiological material dispersal and to assist planners with 
incorporation of the technologies into a concept of operations.  The use of aqueous foam to 
mitigate the effects associated with a radiological dispersal device (RDD) has been studied 
extensively at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) over the past three decades.  To better convey 
the mitigation benefits of using aqueous foam, SNL used an atmospheric dispersion model to 
compare the effects from a mitigated and unmitigated explosive release of an RDD.  Results 
from this study described health effects and land contamination in terms of distances of effect, 
population exposure, and remediation costs.  SNL created a conceptual design for a stationary 
containment area to be located at a facility entrance with equipment that could minimize the 
effects of the detonation of an RDD transported by a vehicle.  A mock-up of the conceptual 
design was constructed at SNL’s 9920 explosive test site. 
 
This study recognized three primary threats from the detonation of unconventional radiological 
dispersal weapons: (1) aerosolization and dispersal of radiological material, (2) overpressure 
blast damage from the high explosive detonation, and (3) ballistic dispersal of fragments from 
the device and surrounding material.  The dispersal of radiological material can result in harmful 
health effects to personnel in the immediate area as well as far downfield.  Additionally, land 
contamination can render large areas inaccessible for substantial periods until costly remediation 
processing is completed.  Blast effects resulting from both overpressure and fragments are dan-
gers to personnel and infrastructure in the immediate area of the device.  Research demonstrates 
that aqueous foams effectively (1) capture explosively dispersed respirable aerosols, (2) 
attenuate blast overpressure, and (3) reduce explosive cloud rise buoyancy. 
 
The aqueous foam used by SNL for high explosive (HE) mitigation is 0.4-1.7% liquid phase, 
with typically a 6% foam concentrate to water ratio.  Commercially available foam generators 
are used to quickly produce large volumes of foams with expansion ratios of 60:1 to 250:1 (e.g., 
for every gallon of water and foam concentrate, 60 to 200 gallons of foam are generated).   The 
aqueous foam is specifically engineered to resist water drainage from the bubble lattice, thus 
retaining its mitigation characteristics for several hours. 
 
The Explosive Release Atmospheric Dispersion (ERAD) model, developed at SNL specifically 
to model the explosive dispersal of radiological materials, was used to compare the resultant 
dose and deposition contours between an unmitigated release and a release mitigated using 
aqueous foams, as shown in Table 1  For the dispersal of 10 kg of plutonium using 25 kg of HE, 
the mitigated land contamination area and associated cleanup costs were lowered by two orders 
of magnitude and the number of people exposed was reduced by over three orders of magnitude 
compared to the unmitigated scenario.  Similarly, the range of blast overpressure damage was 
reduced by three to five times. 
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Table 1.  Comparison of Dose, Land Contamination, Population Exposure, and Remediation Costs 
Between an Unmitigated and Mitigated HE Dispersal of Pu 
96-hr Exposure to 1 rem 
(Evacuation/Sheltering Level) 
EPA Guideline for Relocation 
(2 rem in first year)      
Unmitigated  
Dose 
Mitigated*  
Dose 
Unmitigated 
Deposition 
Mitigated* 
Deposition 
Downwind Length (km) 21.7 0.9 7.3 0.4 
Impact Area (km2) 49.4 0.2 9.37 0.04 
Population Exposed 77867 20 16770 4 
Clean-up Costs (millions $) Not applicable Not applicable $1600 $18 
*Mitigation consisted of 5000 ft3 of 100:1 aqueous foam capable of capturing 99% of respirable particles 
 
If a vehicle inspection at a facility entrance leads to the detection of explosives or of a 
radiological signature from sampling instrumentation, facility security officers are faced with an 
important decision: how next to act.  A logical solution is to remove the suspect vehicle from the 
main traffic flow to a secondary staging area where a more detailed inspection can proceed while 
minimizing potential blast and dispersal of radioactive material effects.  
 
In order to minimize the threat posed by unconventional radioactive dispersal weapons, SNL 
analyzed three designs for a containment area to mitigate the (1) dispersal of airborne radioactive 
material, (2) blast overpressure damage, and (3) fragment dispersal (which would not be 
impeded by aqueous foams).  The three potential mitigating containments all make use of 
aqueous foam’s particle capture and blast suppression characteristics.  Containments were 
compared against several weighted criteria, including mitigation ability, speed of 
implementation, cost, simplicity, and required space. 
 
The containment design that was deemed best consisted of an open air “bunker” located near the 
facility entrance and situated so that suspect vehicles could be redirected from the main traffic 
flow to a secondary staging area.  With walls on three sides, closing the entrance gate would 
complete the containment volume.  The sturdy walls (either sunk below ground level or 
supported with earthen berms above ground) would protect against explosively driven fragments 
and redirect the blast overpressure, protecting personnel and buildings in the area that would 
otherwise be at risk.  A large tank of premixed water and foam concentrate with all the necessary 
plumbing in place would be a “flip-of-the-switch away” from generating foam to fill the bunker 
in only a couple minutes’ time. Nighttime lights would allow for 24-hour operation.  A grating at 
the bottom of the bunker, while closed during foaming, could be opened to drain the standing 
water that would gravitate slowly through the foam.  Benefits of the Mitigation Bunker design 
include protection from explosively driven fragments, isolation of the threat at a staging area, 
and minimal operational training and maintenance costs. 
 
A mock-up of the Mitigation Bunker was constructed at SNL’s 9920 test site.  SNL built a 
wooden framework of approximately 5000 ft3 (20’x28’x9’), plumbing two Mark IV foam 
generators with foam concentrate eductors directly to a fire hydrant such that opening a ball 
valve foamed the containment area in 4.5 minutes.  Faster fills times could be accomplished by 
increasing the number of foam generators and/or using the MSA 3000 foam generators. 
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Foaming would be used only if a detonation was deemed likely.  Because of the foam’s stability, 
under ordinary conditions, drainage of the foam’s water would be less than 50% in three and a 
half hours, unless methods of replenishing the settled water were instituted.  Water drainage 
decreases the foam’s density and its mitigating benefits.  Reentry into and operation in a foam 
containment is problematic at best.  Although there are means to defoam a containment (e.g., 
drains, fans, sprayers), this becomes difficult when dealing with large volumes and should be 
investigated further. 
 
The next logical step in the design process is the construction of a prototype mitigation bunker in 
which we could test foaming systems and modify them to suit our needs.  Using this prototype 
test bed, we could investigate means to increase the foam stability by supplying misters to the 
top of the containment and draining standing water from the containment bottom.  Similarly, we 
could investigate an effective means to remove the foam from the containment in order to regain 
access to the working point, if necessary.  Alternately, means would be investigated to allow 
EOD personnel to work on the device while within the protection of the foam by providing a 
small exclusion volume in which to work. 
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Acronyms 
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1.  Introduction 
The objective of this subtask of the Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Design (UNWD) Project 
was to demonstrate mitigation technologies for radiological material dispersal and to assist 
planners with incorporation of the technologies into a concept of operations (CONOPS). 
 
This study recognized three primary threats from the detonation of unconventional radiological 
dispersal weapons: 
 
(1) aerosolization and dispersal of radiological material, 
(2) overpressure blast damage from the high explosive detonation, and 
(3) ballistic dispersal of larger fragments arising from the device and surrounding material. 
 
The dispersal of radiological material can result in harmful health effects to personnel in the 
immediate area as well as far downfield.  Additionally, land contamination can render large areas 
inaccessible for substantial periods until costly remediation processing is completed.  Blast 
effects resulting from both overpressure and fragments are dangers to personnel and 
infrastructure in the immediate area of the device.  Research demonstrates that aqueous foams 
effectively (1) capture explosively disseminated respirable aerosols, (2) attenuate blast 
overpressure, and (3) reduce explosive cloud rise buoyancy. 
 
Over the last three decades the High Consequence Assessment and Technology department at 
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has studied aqueous foam’s ability to mitigate the effects of 
an explosively disseminated radiological dispersal device (RDD).  These benefits are briefly 
summarized in the Background of this report.  To better convey the aqueous foam attributes, 
SNL conducted a study using the Explosive Release Atmospheric Dispersion model (ERAD), 
comparing the mitigated and unmitigated explosive release of an RDD.  Based on these results, 
SNL created a conceptual design for a stationary containment area to be located at a facility 
entrance with equipment that could minimize the effects of the detonation of an RDD transported 
by a vehicle.  A mock-up of the conceptual design was constructed at SNL’s 9920 explosive test 
site. 
 
Work on this project was sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and 
performed during spring and summer of FY04. 
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2.  Background on Aqueous Foam Characteristics 
The use of aqueous foam to mitigate the effects associated with a radioactive dispersal device 
(RDD) has been studied extensively at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) over the past 30 
years.  The aqueous foam used by SNL for high explosive (HE) mitigation, while visually 
similar to common soap bubbles used in numerous applications (e.g., by fire departments to 
quench chemical and fuel fires), has several unique engineered characteristics.  Foam 
concentrate is mixed into a water stream by educting the concentrate using either around-the-
pump proportioners or in-line eductors, typically in a solution ratio of 6%, although 3-10% 
solutions have been studied as well.  Both eductors and proportioners are standard fire fighting 
equipment.  The foam concentrate (AFC-380) was engineered at SNL to hold water in the bubble 
matrix for extended periods of time, thus minimizing water drainage.  This stability enables the 
aqueous foam to remain effective for several hours.  In contrast, fire fighting foams such as 
AFFF are designed to drain water rapidly, blanketing a ground surface area with water.   
The water and foam concentrate mixture passes through a foam generator where the liquid 
solution is sprayed from a nozzle onto a perforated screen.  Air passes through the generator’s 
screen due to either mechanical means or pressure gradient, resulting in bubble formation with 
0.04-1.7% liquid phase (6% of that being foam concentrate).  SNL currently uses two 
commercially available foam generators:  the MSA 3000 and the Mark IV.  These foam 
generators produce aqueous foams with expansion ratios ranging from 60:1 to 250:1 (e.g., for 
every gallon of water and surfactant, 60 to 200 gallons of foam are generated), making it easy to 
produce large volumes of foam.  The MSA 3000 is a fan-assisted foam generator that produces 
high expansion ratio foam at 2000 ft3/min.  The Mark IV is a smaller, hand-held, air-aspirated 
model that can generate 750 ft3/min.       
The benefits of using aqueous foam to mitigate the effects of HE or RDDs include capture of the 
aerosolized radioactive particles, blast pressure reduction, and buoyant cloud suppression.  SNL 
has performed numerous experiments both at its test site in Albuquerque and at the Nevada Test 
Site (NTS) in order to characterize these parameters.  Figure 1 shows a series of time-lapse 
photographs taken during a 100-lb HE test at NTS.  An identical test was performed (Figure 2) 
except this time the HE was mitigated using SNL’s aqueous foam.  The white shape in the first 
frame is a 50-ft diameter nylon structure (29,000 ft3) called a cone.  The cone was used in the 
mitigated test to provide a containment volume for the 150:1 foam, since the foam does not stack 
on its own more than a few feet.  In Figure 1, the cone was simply air inflated to provide a 
reference.  For the mitigated case (Figure 2), the foam volume of the cone was sufficient to cap-
ture greater than 99% of the respirable particles that would have been released by the detonation 
of an RDD device.  As can be seen by comparing the two sets of pictures, the initial fireball is 
quenched by the foam, leading to a significantly diminished buoyant cloud.  Similarly, the shock 
wave and resulting pressures are greatly reduced.  Because the airborne fraction of particulate is 
virtually eliminated, the result is a smaller footprint, and cleanup is facilitated since airborne 
transport of particles is negligible. 
Aqueous foam has been a part of the United States Emergency Response capabilities for over 20 
years.  The equipment can be palletized or shipped in an internal airlift/helicopter slingable unit 
(ISU) on military transport and contains all of the equipment (e.g., hoses, containment structures,  
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Airborne Transport Downwind 
Shock Wave & Fireball 
Buoyant Cloud Rise 
 
Figure 1. Time-lapse photographs of unmitigated test using 100 lbs of C-4 HE.  The unmitigated test 
used only an air-inflated fabric cone.   
 
Significantly Reduced Airborne Fraction 
Reduced Shock Wave & Quenched Fireball 
Reduced Buoyant Cloud Rise 
 
Figure 2.  Time-lapse photographs of mitigated test using 100 lbs of C-4 HE.  The mitigated test 
used enough foam (50-ft. diameter fabric cone) to capture >99% of aerosolized particulate. 
  
 -14-
pump, foam generators, etc.) required to erect a containment at the working point.  Aqueous 
foam has been used for particle capture and overpressure abatement in several real-world 
applications, including ordnance disposal during the purposeful detonation of sensitive primary 
explosives at the defunct Sooner Defense Inc. explosives manufacturing facility in Lakeland, 
Florida on April 19, 1989 [1].  LANL uses aqueous foams at their Dual Axis Radiographic 
Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility to capture beryllium aerosolized during explosive testing. 
2.1  Aqueous Foam Particle Capture – ERAD Simulation 
To better illustrate the benefits of mitigating the downwind dispersal of radioactive particles, 
Figures 3 and 4 compare unmitigated and mitigated dose and deposition contours.  The figures 
were generated using SNL’s Explosive Release Atmospheric Dispersal (ERAD) model, which is 
capable of modeling the effects of aqueous foam.  ERAD uses an integral plume rise technique 
that tracks particles from time zero onward [2].  Three-dimensional particle transport and 
diffusion are modeled by means of a discrete time Lagrangian Monte Carlo stochastic process 
with contemporary atmospheric boundary layer models that allow for droplet evaporation, calm 
winds, and the ability to handle meteorological inversion layers [3].  The scenario considered 
was the dispersal of 10 kg of weapons-grade plutonium (Pu) using 25 kg of HE at the Kirtland 
AFB contractor gate entrance.  We used identical meteorology (from a weather balloon sounding 
taken at nearby Albuquerque International Airport) for both the unmitigated and mitigated cases. 
 Table 2 summarizes the model’s findings. 
As demonstrated in Figure 3, the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Early Phase (four-
day) Protection Action Guidelines (PAG) for evacuation and sheltering define the dose contour 
levels (1, 5, and 25 rem) [4].  ERAD estimates the chronic dose (initial plume passage and four-
day exposure to groundshine) using the ICRP 60 50-year committed effective dose equivalent 
(CEDE) dose coefficients via inhalation, submersion, and groundshine pathways.  Plutonium 
presents an inhalation danger because of its alpha particle decay. Therefore, the dose represented 
by the contours is primarily the result of the plume passage with virtually zero contribution from 
the four-day groundshine.  The mitigated scenario uses 5000 ft3 (142 m3) of 100:1 expansion 
ratio foam, capturing 99% of the respirable (< 10 µm diameter) plutonium particles.  Five 
thousand cubic feet of foam are similar in size to the enclosure (20’x 28’x 9’) fabricated at SNL 
to demonstrate the proposed design concept (see Section 5).  Figure 3 compares the results of 
unmitigated and mitigated downwind effects.  The model demonstrates how aqueous foam  
Table 2.  Numerical Comparison of Unmitigated and  
Mitigated Effects for Both Chronic Dose and Deposition* 
96-hr Exposure to 1 rem 2-rem Exposure in 1st Year  
Unmitigated 
Dose 
Mitigated 
Dose 
Unmitigated 
Deposition 
Mitigated 
Deposition 
Downwind Distance (km) 21.7 0.9 7.3 0.4 
Impact Area (km2) 49.4 0.2 9.37 0.04 
* Distance, area, and population predictions obtained using SNL ERAD software. 
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Figure 3.  Graphical comparison of unmitigated (upper) vs. mitigated (lower) chronic dose 
contours. 96-hr exposure to EPA Early Phase PAG Levels of 1, 5, and 25 rem (maps are on the same 
scale).  Results obtained using the SNL ERAD model for dispersal of plutonium. 
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Figure 4.  Graphical comparison of unmitigated (upper) and mitigated (lower) deposition contours. 
Levels are derived from the EPA Intermediate Phase PAG of 2-rem dose received between the fourth day 
and the end of the first year.  Inner contours are 5-, 25-, and 50-rem one-year doses (maps are on the 
same scale with inset to detail mitigated deposition).  Results were obtained using the SNL ERAD model 
for HE dispersal plutonium. 
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dramatically reduces the inhalation danger posed by the plutonium dispersal.  For the 
unmitigated scenario, exposures to resident populations were considered (using 2002 US Census 
estimates [5]), 77,867 people would be exposed to a 1-rem dose during plume passage, compared 
with only 20 people for the mitigated scenario. 
 
Figure 4 compares the unmitigated and mitigated contaminated (deposition) land areas.  The 
contour levels for deposition are derived from the EPA Intermediate Phase 2-rem PAG level 
received during the first year following the early phase.  Deposition levels are back-calculated 
using groundshine, submersion, and inhalation dose coefficients.  The inhalation and submersion 
pathways are a function of the resuspension factor.  The USAEC (1975) [6] recommends a 
resuspension factor of 7.2E-6 1/m.  The outer contour (16 µCi/m2) represents the derived 2-rem 
PAG level.  Inner contours are 2.5, 12.5, and 25 times this level.  Unmitigated release in the 
aforementioned scenario results in more than 9 km2 of contaminated land above the EPA 
guidelines, compared with less than 0.1 km2 of contaminated land if the HE were mitigated with 
aqueous foam.   
 
Expanding on the land contamination predictions, these results can best be understood when 
population and economic factors are considered. Using 2002 US Census estimates for 
Albuquerque, unless the area was decontaminated, the unmitigated release could result in almost 
17,000 people being relocated.  The remediation cost for the accidental dispersal of weapons-
grade plutonium [7] is estimated at $127 to $398 million per km2, depending on the ultimate 
level of decontamination deemed acceptable.  The price tag for using a median remediation cost 
to decontaminate 9 km2 of land would be $1600 million.  For the mitigated scenario, only the 
area immediately surrounding the gate would need to be assessed, resulting in a substantially 
simplified clean-up issue ($18 million), with the surrounding area capable of resuming regular 
business activities. 
 
2.2  Particle Capture 
The suspension of water droplets in the bubble lattice is the key to aqueous foam’s ability to 
minimize the dispersion of airborne aerosols following the detonation of an RDD.  As the shock 
wave passes through the foam, minute droplets form as the bubbles pop.  These droplets 
efficiently scrub the respirable aerosols (particles less than 10 µm).  Numerous experimental 
studies were performed at SNL’s test facilities in order to characterize the effectiveness with 
which aqueous foams capture airborne aerosols.  A report by Harper [8] discusses the experi-
mental facility (Figure 5) and instrumentation.  Air samplers were used to measure the persistent 
aerosols released for differing HE masses, foam volumes, expansion ratios, and device 
geometries.  The result was the development of an empirical formula [9] relating the ratio of 
foam mass and explosive mass to particle capture as a function of expansion ratio.  Relatively 
complete capture occurs when the mass ratio is greater than 3.  The particle capture curve can 
predict the fraction of source material captured given both a symmetrical and asymmetrical foam 
thickness.   
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Figure 5.  The Explosive Aerosolization Facility at Sandia National Laboratories used to 
characterize aqueous foam capture of respirable aerosols following HE dissemination. 
2.3  Pressure Attenuation 
The blast suppression benefits of using aqueous foam can be visualized best by revisiting the test 
described in Section 2 (100 lb of C-4 mitigated with a 50-ft diameter cone) and shown in Figure 
1.  In this experiment, a cargo van was parked along the edge of the 50-ft diameter cone.  The 
“witness” van (shown in the left of Figure 6) was destroyed during the unmitigated test; 
however, the “witness” van used during the mitigated detonation was virtually undamaged 
(shown on the right).  These pictures illustrate the dramatic pressure attenuation achieved by 
using aqueous foam. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Witness vans illustrate pressure attenuation benefits associated with aqueous-foam 
mitigation.  Both vans were approximately 30 ft. from 100 lb of C-4 HE. Shown are the results of an 
unmitigated (left) vs. a mitigated (right) detonation. 
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Based on our analysis of numerous explosive tests (see Figure 7), SNL has developed empirical 
relationships for pressure (or impulse) as a function f distance and foam density and thickness 
[9].  The pressures in Figure 7 were measured within the foam.  Peak overpressure of the blast 
wave within several hundred charge radii is generally decreased by more than an order of 
magnitude for foams with 60-300:1 expansion ratios.  Shock overpressure drops substantially 
upon leaving the foam and entering the lower impedance air.  Pressure drop outside the foam is 
predicted from well-characterized explosive tests in air. 
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Figure 7.  Plot of peak pressure vs. distance as a function of foam density [10]. 
Table 3 lists some common HE damaging effects, both structural (e.g., window breakage) and 
injuring (e.g., lung damage) with their associated overpressure failure criteria [10].  For a 100-lb 
explosive, both the unmitigated and mitigated distances are shown for the side-on pressure 
associated with each effect.  For this scenario, using 100:1 foam, distances are decreased by at 
least a factor of 3 and by up to a factor of 5 for windows shattered. 
Table 3.  100-lb C-4 HE 100:1 ER 
Damaging Effects Side-on Pressure* (psi) 
Unmitigated  
Distance (ft) 
Mitigated  
Distance (ft) 
Windows shattered 0.8 256 50 
Structural frame – serious damage 6 62 20 
Lung damage & incapacitation 10 47 16 
Probable total building destruction 11 45 15 
Onset of lethality 25 30 11 
*Side-on pressure used is the average of the range specified in [10] Table XV. 
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3.  Design Selection Criteria 
If a vehicle inspection at a facility entrance leads to the detection of explosives or a radiological 
signature from sampling instrumentation, facility security officers are faced with an important 
decision: how next to act.  A logical solution is to remove the suspect vehicle from the main 
traffic flow to a secondary staging area where a more detailed inspection can proceed at a site 
that minimizes potential blast and dispersal of radioactive material effects.   This flexibility may 
not necessarily exist at all security installations where standoff distances may be less than 
optimal to protect personnel and critical infrastructure from the effects of unconventional 
radioactive dispersal weapons (URDW). 
 
In order to minimize the threats posed by URDW, SNL looked at designs of a containment area 
to mitigate the (1) dispersal of airborne radioactive material, (2) blast overpressure damage, and 
(3) fragment dispersal.  Several potential mitigating designs that make use of aqueous foam’s 
particle capture and blast suppression characteristics were compared. 
 
The optimal design would allow security personnel to immediately “safe” the device or perform 
additional inspections on the suspect vehicle while simultaneously mitigating the effects should 
the weapon be detonated.  Obviously, there are tradeoffs between these two scenarios, as one 
scenario assumes enough proof to act on a detector’s reading, evacuating personnel from the 
area, while the other assumes that further inspection is required.  The most important criterion 
next to successful mitigation of the three threats of a URDW is the speed with which it can be 
implemented.  Mitigation designs (hereafter referred to as containments) that require substantial 
installation to hold the foam around the threat will take much longer to erect.  Both the 
infrequent usage and need for immediate implementation necessitate the simplicity of operation 
of the containment.  This simplicity has the added benefit of minimizing personnel training time, 
cost, and potential errors during implementation.  Maintenance costs also must be considered. 
 
While aqueous foam can efficiently scrub smaller, respirable-size aerosols and attenuate blast 
overpressure, large fragments travel through the foam unimpeded.  A containment capable of 
reducing damage due to fragments provides some protection even without filling the 
containment with foam.  Reentry into and operation in a foam containment is problematic at best. 
 Although there are means to defoam a containment, defoaming becomes difficult when dealing 
with large volumes.  The most expedient method is to remove the containment and let the foam 
disperse by gravity.  Finally, the design needs to be scalable to provide enough foam thickness to 
address the threat for a given facility.  As more space is required, the allowable space 
requirement and installation cost may become prohibitive. 
 
Given the above-mentioned criteria, different weighting factors were defined depending on their 
relative importance.  Three containments were considered and each design’s merits were rated 
against the design criteria.  Table 4 displays the results of this analysis. 
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Table 4.  Matrix of Mitigation Designs and Weighted Success Criteria 
Containment Design Simplicity (Operation) 
Speed 
(Mitigation) 
Stops 
Frag 
Training 
Cost/Time 
Defoaming 
Time Space 
Installation 
Cost 
Maintenance 
Cost Total 
Fabric enclosure - 
Moveable  
3 Slow No High Medium Low Medium High 20 
Fabric enclosure - 
fixed 
2 Medium No Low/ 
Medium 
Short Low Low/Mediu
m 
Medium 56 
Open Bunker 1 Fast Yes Low Long Medium/
High 
High Low 73 
Weighting factors  30 20 15 10 10 10 5  
 
The first containment is a fabric enclosure (Figure 8) currently designed for use by the DOE 
Emergency Response Community.  Its advantages are that it requires minimal space and is 
portable; therefore, it can be implemented where space permits.  The nylon cone is currently 
available in 30-, 50-, and 70-ft diameters.  The buoyancy of the foam-filled cone is 
counterbalanced with numerous water bags placed evenly around the cone’s perimeter. However, 
this containment also has several disadvantages:  
 
• Installation and foaming are lengthy processes (>1 hr);  
• Implementation requires several personnel (at least 3) and  
• The installation process is prone to errors for inexperienced personnel, thus mandating 
extensive and costly training.   
• Due to deterioration of materials, maintenance costs would be highest of the three 
designs considered.  
• Neither the nylon fabric of the cone nor the foam would reduce the threat from 
fragments. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Containment Design 1: 50-ft diameter nylon cone. 
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The second containment system considered was also a fabric enclosure, but one that was more 
permanently located in a designated staging area.  Ideally, the suspect vehicle would be driven 
within a stand supporting a fabric curtain that could be lowered quickly into position around the 
vehicle, providing a containment volume for the foam (Figure 9).  Given the fixed location, all 
the necessary foam generation equipment could be pre-plumbed and ready for operation with 
potentially the flip of a switch.  Implementation would be much faster than for the cone and 
training time/costs reduced as well.  By raising the nylon curtain, personnel could release the 
foam from the working point and regain access, if necessary.  Minimal space would be required 
for this design.  However, similar to the cone, there is no protection against fragments, and 
maintenance costs due to equipment exposure to the elements would be moderate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Containment Design 2: Retractable nylon curtain at fixed location. 
The final containment design uses sturdy concrete walls bolstered by earthen berms, resembling 
an open bunker.  This containment can be sunken below ground level, have walls constructed 
above ground level, or a combination of the two (Figure 10).  A permanently plumbed foam-
generation system could be started with the flip of a switch, requiring security personnel only to 
understand the concept of operations (under what conditions to trigger the system).  Of the three 
designs considered, the mitigation bunker was deemed the best solution because it provides 
inherent protection from explosively driven fragments, an established containment volume 
capable of being foamed quickly, operational simplicity, and requires minimal training for 
security personnel.   
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4.  Mitigation Bunker 
4.1  Description 
Figure 10 is an artist’s concept of the mitigation bunker design.  Located near the facility 
entrance, the bunker would be situated so that suspect vehicles could be redirected from the main 
traffic flow to a secondary staging area.  In this scenario the vehicle would be driven down a 
ramp to a recessed bunker (or between earthen berm walls) where security personnel could 
perform more detailed searches.  If a threat were deemed imminent, the bunker would be foamed 
immediately to suppress blast overpressure and capture otherwise dispersed aerosols.  With walls 
on three sides, simply closing the entrance gate would complete the containment volume.  The 
sturdy walls would protect against explosively driven fragments being shot ballistically in the 
lateral direction and would redirect the blast overpressure, protecting personnel and buildings in 
the area that would otherwise be at risk. 
 
Ultimately, the size of the bunker would depend on the threat to the installation, such that the 
volume of foam would be sufficient to attenuate the overpressure as well as capture at least 98% 
of the material.  The conceptual design includes three Mark IV foam generators, each capable of 
generating up to 750 ft3/min of 100:1.  The number of foam generators used would be tailored to 
maximize the fill rate of the bunker’s containment.  A large tank of premixed water and foam 
concentrate insulated from the weather and with all the necessary plumbing in place would 
simplify and hasten the foaming operation.  Large-scale foaming equipment systems designed 
for industrial application are available, and could be tailored for this application, thus reducing 
development and manufacturing costs.  Nighttime lights would allow for 24-hour operation.  A 
grating at the bottom of the bunker, while closed during foaming, could be opened to drain the 
standing water that would gravitate slowly through the foam, or could be engineered to remove 
the persistent foam if the suspected device does not detonate and emergency personnel require 
access to the working point. 
 
4.2  Discussion of Advantages and Disadvantages 
The Mitigation Bunker design at facility entrances provides several benefits as a means to deal 
with URDW threats.  Of the three threats considered in Section 3, only the bunker design 
provides protection against explosively driven fragments.  Because of the proposed scalable 
design, the threat would be isolated at a staging area where secondary HE and radiation detection 
searches could be carried out with some protection provided.  This simple design requires 
minimal training and maintenance and is flexible to allow construction below ground, above 
ground, or a combination of the two.  Most pertinent of all, the containment could be foamed 
rapidly to mitigate the pursuant radiological contamination. 
 
Possible disadvantages of this design are the installation cost and space requirements, which may 
not be available at some installations.  Additionally, because the foams were engineered for 
stability, the ability to remove the foam quickly in the event of reentry by responders would need 
to be engineered. 
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Figure 10.  Conceptualization of the mitigation bunker: located near facility entrance (top); detail, 
with guards providing addtional inspections (middle); and filling with aqueous foam (bottom). 
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5.  Proof of Design and Demonstration 
To better convey the Mitigation Bunker Design concept, SNL built a temporary mock-up (Figure 
11). The construction consisted of removing a section of dirt from an existing earthen berm, 
building three temporary plywood walls, and partially backfilling the dirt to convey the sturdy 
bunker-like construction.  Were the design implemented at a facility, sturdy concrete walls 
would replace the flimsy wooden mock-up.  The mock-up was 28 feet wide, 20 feet deep, and 
roughly 9 feet tall for a total volume of 5000 ft3.  The actual entrance would consist of a sturdy, 
hinged gate; however, a nylon fabric affixed to either side of the bunker was used as the entrance 
in the mock-up.  A cargo van was placed in the containment for reference. 
 
  
Figure 11.  Mitigation Bunker Demonstration. 
The containment was foamed using two MSA Mark IV foam generators (Figure 11).  The 
generators were plumbed directly to a water source (fire hydrant) and used two L95C eductors to 
mix 6% foam concentrate with water during foam generation.  This simple design only required 
flipping a switch (in this case opening a ball valve) to begin foaming the containment.  An 
equally simple operating sequence is proposed for the Mitigation Bunker, albeit with permanent 
plumbing and the ability to initiate the foaming from several locations, so that it is always at 
security personnel’s fingertips. 
 
The containment filled in less than four and a half minutes, or an approximate flow rate of 500 
ft3/min per generator of 100:1 foam.  Obviously, the fill time could be shortened by using either 
additional Mark IV generators, or switching to faster foam generators such as the MSA 3000. 
 
When filled, the containment would capture at least 97% of the respirable material for HE 
detonations less than or equal to 25 kg (55 lb).  See Section 2.1  for an atmospheric dispersion 
model’s comparison between foamed and unmitigated scenarios. 
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6.  Concept of Operations 
For any mitigation strategy, the concept of operations assumes that the suspect vehicle is 
separated from its driver; otherwise, the terrorist who is still in possession of the weapon could 
conceivably detonate it at any time.  Either the process of removing the suspect must occur to 
avoid arousing suspicion or the suspect would have to view his intended target worth the risk.  
After all, being stopped at the facility entrance does not gain the terrorist any advantage over 
simply detonating the URDW anywhere along the facility perimeter.  The goal of a security 
checkpoint is to control access to the facility, critical infrastructure, and personnel. In this case, 
the facility is secure, even though the optimal goal of securing the device is not achieved.   
 
After a positive reading from either the HE or radiological detectors, the driver could either be 
removed from the vehicle at the facility entrance or be asked to move the vehicle to a second 
location (e.g., the mitigation bunker) for additional searching similar to those performed at 
facility entrances during increased threat conditions (i.e., random vehicle searches during 
ThreatCON BRAVO).  Using detailed searches, security personnel could determine the reason 
for the initial positive reading and decide whether further actions would be required. 
 
Foaming should be used only if the URDW detonation was deemed likely within the next two 
hours.  Because of the foam’s stability, under nominal conditions, drainage of the foam’s water 
would be less than 50% in three hours, unless methods of replenishing the settled water were 
instituted (see Section 7).  Otherwise, water drainage decreases the foam’s density and its 
mitigating benefits.  While foaming may be deemed as a means to temporarily “store” the device 
while awaiting explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) or other emergency personnel, consideration 
must also be given to regaining access to the device should detonation not occur, and emergency 
response personnel would be required to render the weapon safe.  It is nearly impossible for 
EOD to operate within the aqueous foam (self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) is required 
and visibility is near zero), so the foam would have to be removed (see Section 7) or an 
exclusion volume placed around the vehicle for the render-safe personnel to operate. 
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7.  Further Work 
While SNL has developed a detailed understanding of aqueous foam benefits, there is a 
substantial step from the conceptualization of the mitigation bunker to installation of a reliable 
system, capable of enduring weather cycling, aging, etc.  Additionally, the concept of operations 
is something that needs to be definitively set.  Is a vehicle immediately foamed upon radiation 
and/or explosive detection?  If so, assuming that facility entrance security personnel are not 
trained in disruption methods, does the containment serve as a holding facility until EOD or 
emergency response personnel arrive to defuse the weapon?  How long would the foam have to 
last?  There may be ways to extend the mitigation capabilities of aqueous foam, such as using 
misters to reapply water to the bubble matrix that has drained out.   
 
If access to the working point is required following foaming, a reliable, expedient defoaming 
method is required in the event that the device does not detonate and emergency personnel must 
regain access to the working point.  Various methods of defoaming have been investigated: 
mechanical (suction, high-volume blowers, foam-particle impaction, water sprays), thermal 
(heaters) and chemical (defoaming agents).  Individually, none of these methods has proven 
effective at defoaming large volumes.  However, the task would be simplified for a fixed 
containment of known volume.  Drains, fans, sprayers, etc. could be installed permanently to 
optimize the rate of foam removal. 
 
The next logical step in the design process would be the construction of a prototype mitigation 
bunker in which we could test commercially available foaming systems and modify them to suit 
our needs.  Using this prototype test bed, we could investigate means to increase the foam 
stability by supplying water to the top of the containment while simultaneously draining water at 
the same rate from the bottom.  Similarly, we could investigate an effective means to remove the 
foam from the containment.  Alternately, means should be investigated to allow EOD personnel 
to work on the device while still under the protection of the foam by providing a small exclusion 
volume in which to work. 
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